the ways in which this understanding of Kantian constructivism fits within the broader comparative project in ‘moral theory’ that. Rawls inherits from Sidgwick. The author outlines the chief features of the constructivist moral conception in its Kantian KANTIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM IN MORAL THEORY. John Rawls. The papers by Rawls most relevant here are: “Kantian Constructivism in Moral. Theory: The Dewey Lectures ,” Journal of Philosophy 77 ():
|Published (Last):||2 January 2009|
|PDF File Size:||20.63 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||9.75 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
No keywords specified fix it. This test of rejectability specifies the content of moral principles, and tells us why it is rational for us to adopt them.
Constructivism has theoty a major view in contemporary practical philosophy.
John Rawls, Kantian constructivism in moral theory – PhilPapers
Miral standards are supposed to be partly descriptive of the very activity that they theoey to assess Korsgaard If it is, then the constraints are not themselves constructed and acceptance of them commits one to realism Shafer-Landau Other varieties of metaethical constructivism are emerging, building upon the insights of philosophers other than Kant: Besch – – European Journal of Philosophy 19 1: It is realist insofar as it claims that moral propositions are truth-evaluable, and koral some moral properties are instantiated; and it is naturalistic because it claims that such moral properties are natural properties Copp In this sense, construcyivism is not optional.
Carla Bagnoli – – Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. However, she remains convinced that the Kantian idea of self-constitution is indispensable for giving an account of agency, and therefore of moral agency, itself.
In deliberating, we attribute to ourselves the power to confer value on our ends by rationally choosing them. Even though moral norms are not necessary requirements of reason, there is a sense in which they are not contingent because they play a large role in our lives.
Oxford University Press,61— The second way to construe the objection that constructivism tacitly relies on or commits to realism focuses on the constitutivist strategy adopted by many constructivists involves. Kant holds that all previous ethical theories have failed to account for moral obligation because they have failed as theories of practical reason Kant G 4: In contrast to the antirealist varieties of metaethical constructivism, Copp defends society-based constructivism as both a decisively realist and naturalistic theory.
This is not only a psychological question about the impact that such a fact might have on our minds, but also, and most importantly, a normative question that concerns its authority.
Constructivism comes in several varieties, some of which claim a place within metaethics while others claim no place within it at all. But the moral law obliges us only insofar as it is self-legislated.
In either case, Kantian ethics seems incapable to account for the relevance of circumstances for ethical judgments. While it is possible to disengage from any particular ordinary activities, some sort of agency continues to operate Ferrero a, also Velleman They fail to explain how reason plays a role in our life because they misunderstand its practical function and mischaracterize its relation with the ends of choice.
Kantian Constructivism, the Issue of Scope, and Perfectionism: Rather, they are grounded in a substantive account of the good life, which is inspired by ancient eudaimonism. For Kant heteronomy is a form of moral skepticism, understood as skepticism about the power of reason to establish moral truths and their authority. Foundations and Novel Applications.
KANTIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM IN MORAL THEORY
This is where the difference among the varieties of constructivism is acute. Cambridge University Press,8: As a consequence, the realist also fails to show why we really ought to do as morality says, and thus fails as an account of the authority of constrkctivism obligations Korsgaard a; Korsgaard This is because sentimentalism treats moral obligations as cinstructivism upon our interests, and thus as having limited authority.
For the constructivist, there is an interesting continuity between normative discourse and metaethics. According to Scanlon, in order for there to be truths about reasons, it is not necessary for these normative facts to have a kind of metaphysical reality that good normative reasoning might not guarantee.
Constructivism in Metaethics
This kind of reply is shared by Kantians BagnoliHumeans Velleman Thus, their claim is that to solve metaethical problems about the nature of ethical judgments and normative truths, one should start with an account of practical reason, that which has been left out by standard metaethics.
The question of how to classify metaethical constructivism will be addressed in what follows by focusing on the distinctive questions that constructivist theories have been designed to answer. There are objective reasons that prohibit deceiving and manipulating others, but such reasons are the result of practical reasoning, rather than discovered by rawps investigation, grasped by the intellect, or revealed by some god.
They bear a problematic relation to traditional classifications of metaethical theories. According to the sentimentalist, the role of reason is solely instrumental. Korsgaard argues tyeory some kind of integrity is necessary to be an agent and cannot be achieved without a commitment to morality, which is founded on reason.
Cristina Lafont – – Ratio Juris 17 1: