“A recipe for thought”. •. •. Fred Dretske a sketch of a “naturalistic” account of intentional mental states (a “psychosemantics”). “Thought may be intentional. View Notes – dretske from PHIL at University Of Arizona. Fred Dretske A recipe for thought Phil/Psyc Fall How do you build a thinking thing?. A question about Dretske’s idea that intentionality can be located in things outside of the mind — such as compasses, thermometers, and even.
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Yehudah Freundlich – – Dialogue 16 3: Added to PP index Total downloads 6, of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 3of 2, How can I increase my downloads? You are commenting using your WordPress.
Intentionality — Peter No keywords specified fix it. The Nature of Thought. Dretske also maintains a causal theory of intentionality such that mental states represent something, like tree rings represent something, and argues that the intentionality of mental states can be reduced to their evolutionary biological function.
Gendered Metaphors for Genetic Medicine. To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: Fred Dretske – – Philosophical Studies 70 2: When I am thinking about something that does not exist, it has no place in the physical world. The thoughts about that monster are further intentional states, however the language that the subject speaks about the monster or the painting that the subject does of the monster are not.
A Recipe for Thought
An Encyclopediaed. In contrast, when a person sees a dog their experience is about the dog no matter who or what else exists in the world, and so in an important sense this about-ness, which we call intentionality, is more important.
Wai-Shun Hung – – Philosophy Today 57 3: Gordon Giles – – Philosophy Now Science Logic and Mathematics. Recently I have been considering the idea that it is only possible to determine if a system is conscious by examining how the state of the system in a given instant is connected to previous and subsequent moments, as thouhht as the properties of the system at that moment which are all some theories consider relevant for consciousness.
mental_content [Philosophy of Mind]
It is the derived power of such objects to misrepresent that Dretskep. A Recipe for Authenticity. For Dretske Jacobinformation exhibits some degree of intentionality and is able to show both the intentionality of beliefs as well as its derived intentionality of an utterance that can misrepresent such information. Like shadows on the wall that make one believe that there is a monster, they are a particular feature of our imagination.
Fred Dretske, A Recipe for Thought – PhilPapers
National Health Thkught and other mental illnesses that have dire physical effects are examples of such intentional mental states. A sentence can be intentional yet be completely separate from intentionality and also sentences that report mental states need not be intensional Byrne n.
He also contended that it is possible for two different states to be directed towards the same object and only psychological phenomena had this object directedness Chalmersp.
Most significantly we have thoughts about external objects that are about them, but these thoughts are not caused directly by those objects.
Talk of the use of a compass gives it an intensional context. Classical and Contemporary Readings, D. To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: This claim was derived from the thesis of the nineteenth century philosopher Franz Brentano in his book Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Categories 21st centuryconsumerism, Sigmund Cretske, marketing, advertising, wish fulfilment, desiresdrtske states.
The criterion for this primitive intentionality is that a property, P, of a system is about some feature of the world, C, if and only if the presence of P is usually caused by C.
As far as the operation of the mind is concerned the cause of P is irrelevant in the sense that the mind will have the same sequence of states, and the same consciousness, regardless of whether P at a particular moment is caused by C or by something else.
Notify me of new comments via email. Find it on Scholar. This article has no associated abstract. However, Chisholm statesp.